{"id":2231,"date":"2012-05-27T20:48:22","date_gmt":"2012-05-27T19:48:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/bassdu.mine.nu\/?p=2231"},"modified":"2012-05-28T00:00:55","modified_gmt":"2012-05-27T23:00:55","slug":"continuitatea-traco-geto-daca-in-spatiul-carpato-dunareano-pontic-5","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/?p=2231","title":{"rendered":"Continuitatea traco-geto-dac\u0103 \u00een spa\u0163iul carpato-dun\u0103reano-pontic (5)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Acuza\u0163ia de NA\u0162IONALISM ne-o \u00eensu\u015fim cu m\u00e2ndrie !<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Cum al\u0163ii se declar\u0103 \u201econtra\u201d, \u00eei \u00eentreb\u0103m ce \u015ftiu despre citatele de mai jos \u015fi ce au f\u0103cut dac\u0103 le-au citit !? Este vorba de lucrarea d-lui Larry Watts \u201eFere\u015fte-m\u0103 Doamne de prieteni !\u201d<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.libris.ro%2Fpolitica%2Ffereste-ma-doamne-de-prieteni—larry-watts-RAO978-606-8255-95-8–c7926–p370518.html&h=IAQHPUsGFAQEzFK1i5QxoMInpEL0vwUcdUN_4II1VqutOVw<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

S-au ocupat de scrierea acestei Istorii, c\u0103 doar e… \u201edocumentat\u0103\u201d !?<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Posibilit\u0103\u0163ile sunt dou\u0103 :<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Sunt dobitoci \u015fi \u201ese dau la noi\u201d c\u00e2nd ar avea altceva de f\u0103cut.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

2.Ignor\u0103 cu bun\u0103 \u015ftiin\u0163\u0103 \u015fi… interes.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0………………………………………………………………………………………..<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00cen leg\u0103tur\u0103 cu NOUA POLITIC\u0102 REGIONAL\u0102 pe care \u201eMi\u015fcarea Dacia\u201d o are \u00eentre Obiective \u015fi e determinat\u0103 de Principii, unii ar putea s\u0103 r\u0103m\u00e2n\u0103 un pic PERPLEC\u015eI, de dat\u0103 ce \u201epunem pe mas\u0103 aceste citate\u201d.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Ei bine, noi vom pune bazele acestei NOI POLITICI REGIONALE, pornind de la ASUMAREA ADEV\u0102RULUI ISTORIC de c\u0103tre to\u0163i cei viza\u0163i \u00een aceste citate !!! Numai pe aceast\u0103 baz\u0103, se poate \u201econstrui solid\u201d !!!<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Asta nu \u00eenseamn\u0103 c\u0103 trebuie \u201es\u0103 cobor\u00e2m garda\u201d !!!\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

………………………………………………………………………………………………………<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00cen alt\u0103 ordine de idei, cineva ar putea \u00eentreba \u201ece leg\u0103tur\u0103 au aceste citate cu CONTINUITATEA\u201d !?<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Au domnilor, deoarece sunt peste 2000 de ani c\u0103 diver\u015fi venetici caut\u0103 s\u0103 ne \u201e\u015ftearg\u0103 de pe fa\u0163a P\u0103m\u00e2ntului\u201d, iar citatele se refer\u0103 la ultimii 100 de ani !!! \u00a0Acest \u201eultim curs al desfiin\u0163\u0103rii noastre ca Na\u0163ie\u201d, porne\u015fte \u00een mod \u00a0principal cu aceast\u0103 afirma\u0163ie :\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201e Rom\u00e2nii sunt un popor f\u0103r\u0103 istorie , destina\u0163i s\u0103 piar\u0103 \u00een furtuna revolu\u0163iei mondiale . Ei sunt suporteri fanatici ai contrarevolu\u0163iei \u015fi vor r\u0103m\u00e2ne astfel p\u00e2n\u0103 la extirparea sau pierderea caracterului lor na\u0163ional , la fel cum propria lor existen\u0163\u0103 , \u00een general , reprezint\u0103 prin ea \u00eens\u0103\u015fi un protest contra unei m\u0103re\u0163e revolu\u0163ii istorice . Dispari\u0163ia lor de pe fa\u0163a p\u0103m\u00e2ntului va fi un pas \u00eenainte . ( Karl Marx \u015fi Friedrich Engels \u2013 Opere Complete , Vol. 8 , Pag. 229 )\u201d<\/strong><\/span>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

………………………………………………………………………………………………….<\/p>\n

II<\/strong><\/span>
\nImperial Ambitions, Communist Conflicts<\/strong><\/span>
\nSurely you don\u2019t suppose we\u2019d fight for the Rumanians do you?1<\/span>
\n– Allied Russian Commander, General Andrei Zaionchikovski, July 1916
\nSuch are my feelings that if His Majesty (the Tsar) ordered me to send fifteen wounded<\/span>
\n soldiers to Rumania, I would on no account send a sixteenth.2<\/span>
\n– Imperial Russian Chief of Staff, General Mikhail Alexiev, December 1916
\n[Romania is] the Center of Counter-revolution in the South.3<\/span>
\n– Soviet Foreign Commissariat, November 1918
\n[Preventing] Entente imperialism from forcing Hungary to hand over its territory, food,<\/span>
\n industries, and prime materials to the Romanian oligarchy, is the guiding principle of the<\/span>
\n proletarian revolution.4<\/span>
\n– B\u00e9la Kun to Lenin, March 1919
\nUntil the time is ripe for an attack, pacific relations should be maintained with Romania,<\/span>
\n yet every opportunity must be used to isolate it diplomatically and an active irredentist<\/span>
\n organization must continue to exist in Transylvania.5<\/span>
\n– Admiral Mikl\u00f3s Horthy, October 1919
\n[I]ntensify Communist work among the Magyar population of those territories annexed<\/span>
\n to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia [for] self-determination up to the secession<\/span>
\n from the states which had annexed them.6<\/span>
\n– KOMINTERN 5th World Congress, July 1924
\n[C]onditions do not permit the immediate realization of the liberation of Bessarabia<\/span>
\n from under the foreign bourgeois-landowner yoke [while] the struggle of the USSR…is<\/span>
\n transferred onto the field of diplomatic activity.7<\/span>
\n– Bessarabian Society Congress, April 1925
\nThe Daco-Romanians must disappear from this territory [of Transylvania].8<\/strong><\/span>
\n– Popular Budapest newspaper, April 1932<\/p>\n

III<\/strong><\/span>
\nStalin\u2019s Leveraging of Transylvania<\/strong><\/span>
\nIt is clear that the responsible government cannot employ all means necessary to attain<\/span>
\n the goal for political reasons. …activity against the Romanians in northern Transylvania<\/span>
\n can only be executed by non-official Hungarian patriots [with] the secret support of the<\/span>
\n responsible Hungarian government… [Those engaged] in actions against the Romanians<\/span>
\n must be entirely assured of immunity from punishment. 1<\/span>
\n– Plan Adopted by Hungarian Government, December 1941
\nThe solution remains separating Transylvania…either provisionally, until we reach an<\/span>
\n accord with Hungary or Romania, or long-term, bearing in mind that this small state<\/span>
\n will need a protector, which could only be the Soviet Union. …Romania\u2019s dependence<\/span>
\n on us will be even greater if Transylvania remains a self-standing state and its future<\/span>
\n passing to Romania will depend on us 2<\/span>
\n– Soviet \u201cLitvinov\u201dCommission, June 1944
\nThat still does not mean that Transylvania is given definitively to Romania.3<\/strong><\/span>
\n– Joseph Stalin, March 1945
\nFirst of all, Hungary presented her territorial claims to Romania. We know that Romania<\/span>
\n contributed to Hitler\u2019s victory by fighting, whereas we contributed to it only by working.<\/span>
\n …[T]he satisfaction of the modest and real minimal Hungarian territorial claims would<\/span>
\n best serve the interest of Romanian democracy, too.4<\/span>
\n– M\u00e1ty\u00e1s R\u00e1kosi, August 1945
\nThe common ideal can only be realized through a well directed propaganda… Our<\/span>
\n trustworthy elements should infiltrate the Romanian Communist Party through any<\/span>
\n possible path, where they should act intensively and in a disciplined manner, winning trust<\/span>
\n in order to obtain important posts especially in the state administration. Our misguided<\/span>
\n brothers who currently collaborate with the Romanian democratic parties should also be<\/span>
\n convinced that through their votes to give concourse to our cause.5<\/span>
\n– Hungarian Government Instruction, September 1946
\nWithout Transylvania there is no Hungary, because Transylvania was always the true<\/span>
\n Hungary.6<\/span>
\n– Hungarian poet Ady Endre, 1954
\n[P]art of Transylvania must be returned to Hungary.7<\/span>
\n– M\u00e1ty\u00e1s R\u00e1kosi, September 1954<\/p>\n

IV<\/span><\/strong>
\nSlipping Moscow\u2019s Leash<\/span><\/strong>
\nUnder Khrushchev<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong>
\nGive autonomy to Transylvania.1<\/span>
\n– J\u00e1nos K\u00e1d\u00e1r, October 1956
\n[T]he Romanian Government does not consider the stationing of Soviet troops on its<\/span>
\n territory to be necessary… At the same time, the Government of the Soviet Union [should<\/span>
\n consider] the problem of recalling Soviet advisors working for various institutions of the<\/span>
\n Romanian People\u2019s Republic…2<\/span>
\n– Romanian Politburo Instruction, October 1956
\nThe appellation \u2018Soviet advisors\u2019 does not correspond to the role they play and might<\/span>
\n inadvertently convey the mistaken idea that these advisors are meddling in Romanian<\/span>
\n internal affairs.3<\/span>
\n– Nikita Khrushchev, January 1957
\nIn Romania, and even in the ranks of its Communist Party, pernicious nationalist and<\/span>
\n anti-Soviet attitudes were developing which must be cut off the root. …The Mamalizhniki*<\/span>
\n are not a nation, but a whore.4<\/span>
\n– Nikita Khrushchev, September 1960
\nMaintaining intelligence networks in the interior of the Party, in a Socialist state, is<\/span>
\n something you do only when you consider that you are in a position of supremacy [and]<\/span>
\n the other a subordinate…it is not only a transgression of sovereignty, but indicative of<\/span>
\n something more difficult to qualify, the relationship of master and slave. …We raised<\/span>
\n the question of their not having agent networks in any Socialist country which, on top of<\/span>
\n everything else, made Khrushchev call us \u201cbastards.\u201d5<\/span>
\n– Gheorghiu Dej, August 1963
\nRomanian attempts to become independent from COMECON [CMEA] economically<\/span>
\n could be tolerated, but if they are so blind as to try and leave the Warsaw Pact then our<\/span>
\n soldiers…will have the last word …The entire situation of the Balkans would become<\/span>
\n uncontrollable if Romania would follow Yugoslavia and Albania into the anti-Soviet<\/span>
\n camp.6<\/span>
\n\u2013 Nikita Khrushchev, August 1964
\nTransylvania has always been Hungarian…the Magyar language and Hungarian culture<\/span>
\n predominate there.7<\/span>
\n– Nikita Khrushchev, 1964<\/p>\n

V<\/strong><\/span>
\nFrom Bucharest Spring to Prague Spring<\/strong><\/span>
\n[An] international center is no longer adequate. …No party is allowed to go over the<\/span>
\n heads of the party leaders of one country or another, and even less to launch appeals for<\/span>
\n the removal or change of the leadership of a party.1<\/span>
\n– RCP \u2018Declaration of Independence, April 1964
\n[I]f Rumania had its way it would not belong to any pact including Warsaw Pact and<\/span>
\n would be concerned only with defense its own frontiers. …Rumania maintains its military<\/span>
\n alliances with reluctance and their only concern is defense of their own country.2<\/span>
\n– Romanian Army officers, November 1964
\n[W]ithin the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Unified Command, the armies of the<\/span>
\n other socialist countries of Europe are subordinated [to Moscow]. We intend to do away<\/span>
\n with this state of affairs.3<\/span>
\n– Ceau\u015fescu to Deng Xiaoping, July 1965
\n[Romania seeks] to paralyze the alliance and transform its organs into noncommittal<\/span>
\n discussion clubs.4<\/span>
\n– Polish Foreign Ministry, February 1966
\nCeau\u015fescu has been vigorously delivering speeches saying that Romanians, together with<\/span>
\n all countries of the socialist camp, will fight against imperialist aggression. Of course,<\/span>
\n that is merely a fa\u00e7ade. Everything indicates that they intend to finally break relations<\/span>
\n with our camp. One cannot exclude their…withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.5<\/span>
\n– Leonid Brezhnev, July 1967
\nWhat is the line followed by the Romanian leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet!<\/span>
\n In whose favor is such a political line? Who permits the heads of the Romanian leadership<\/span>
\n to play with the fate of the Romanian working class, with the interests of our system, which<\/span>
\n has been struggling for so many years? Who has permitted them that, who has given them<\/span>
\n such right?! 6<\/span>
\n– Todor Zhivkov, March 1968
\n[The Romanians] welcome the events happening in Czechoslovakia, since they suppose<\/span>
\n that they might find allies against the Soviet Union, against CMEA, and against the<\/span>
\n Warsaw Pact there.7<\/span>
\n\u2013 J\u00e1nos K\u00e1d\u00e1r, June 1968<\/p>\n

VI<\/strong><\/span>
\n1968:<\/strong><\/span>
\n\u2018Tourists,\u2019 Friends & Dissappointments<\/strong><\/span>
\n[W]e are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in<\/span>
\n Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too.1<\/span>
\n– Todor Zhivkov, March 1968
\n[Romania] must toe the line or take the consequences.2<\/span>
\n– General Wojiech Jaruzelski, August 1968
\nTwice in your lifetime and mine world war has come upon us, triggered by events in<\/span>
\n Eastern Europe. …I would hope that your government would hold its hand, if it is the<\/span>
\n case that a military movement is contemplated against Rumania or any other country in<\/span>
\n Eastern Europe.3<\/span>
\n– Lyndon B. Johnson to Alexei Kosygin, August 1968
\n[Over 100] Soviet officers dressed in civilian clothes arrived under cover as tourists<\/span>
\n on [to take over the airport.]… Approximately ten days beforehand, Soviet officers<\/span>
\n dressed in civilian clothing were sent into Czechoslovakia as \u2018tourists\u2019 to undertake the<\/span>
\n reconnaissance of important military objectives. During the night of 20-21 August, they<\/span>
\n changed their civilian clothes for military uniforms and carried out their mission.4<\/span>
\n– Romanian Intelligence Report, September 1968
\nOrders were prepared last week for invasion of Romania by Soviet, Polish and Hungarian<\/span>
\n troops on 22 November at 0400 hours…orders referred to an invasion and not to an<\/span>
\n exercise.5<\/span>
\n– Dutch Military Intelligence, November 1968
\n[W]e cannot exclude the possibility that the Russians are making preparations for very<\/span>
\n early military action against Romania. …We think it right to ensure that the Romanians<\/span>
\n are aware of our assessment. This should be done at the highest level possible, and in<\/span>
\n strict confidence.6<\/span>
\n– British Foreign Minister Stewart, November 1968
\nAt the time they had great plans, not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against you<\/span>
\n and Yugoslavia. If you are prepared, they will fear you. … We are helping those who<\/span>
\n fight against invasion.7<\/span>
\n– Mao Zedong to Nicolae Ceau\u015fescu, June 1971<\/p>\n

VII<\/strong><\/span>
\nTargeting Romania After the Invasion<\/strong><\/span>
\n[Moscow will use joint exercises] to attempt to achieve, as it did in Czechoslovakia, the<\/span>
\n permanent stationing of Soviet troops and also the replacement of several high officials of<\/span>
\n the party and state who in one way or another oppose the Soviet line. …[T]he contingency<\/span>
\n plan of the Soviet leadership provided for instigation of diversions among population and<\/span>
\n the establishment of pro-Soviet factions to oppose the measures taken by the Romanian<\/span>
\n government, both domestically and in foreign policy.1<\/span>
\n– West German Military Intelligence, January 1969
\nRomania refuses to participate to the common military measures of the Warsaw Pact and<\/span>
\n requests the restructuring of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces, which would<\/span>
\n mean in fact a disintegration of the armed forces and an objective weakening of their<\/span>
\n firepower.2<\/span>
\n– Stasi Report, February 1969
\nOf course, we are by no means trying to cause a conflict. We are trying to find some common<\/span>
\n ground with the Soviet Union…based on a set of principles. If the Soviet Union tries to do<\/span>
\n in Romania what it did in Czechoslovakia we will fight back. Of course, we don\u2019t have the<\/span>
\n pretension to crush the Soviet army, to reach Moscow and dictate peace to the Kremlin…<\/span>
\n We cannot do this, but we will fight in Romania the same way the Vietnamese are.3<\/span>
\n– Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Zhou Enlai, September 1969
\n[W]here did Chou En-lai get the idea that there was some threat to Romania, when [we]<\/span>
\n who are Romania\u2019s neighbors know of no such thing?…Maybe Romania does not desire<\/span>
\n to participate in the Warsaw Pact?4<\/span>
\n– Leonid Brezhnev, May 1970
\nThe Romanian comrades still criticize the actions of the socialist countries [in invading<\/span>
\n Czechoslovakia] even during other parties\u2019 congresses, and even though so much time has<\/span>
\n passed. Of course, this only complicates the relationship among our people.5<\/span>
\n– Leonid Brezhnev, June 1971
\n[Ceau\u015fescu\u2019s Beijing trip] was directed against the unity and solidarity of the Warsaw<\/span>
\n Treaty states and the cohesion of the International Communist and Workers\u2019 Movement. …<\/span>
\n It is not to be excluded that the Socialist Romanian Republic assumed a \u201cmediating\u201d role<\/span>
\n in the relations between China and the US, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany<\/span>
\n during this visit.6<\/span>
\n– East German Intelligence, June 1971<\/p>\n

VIII<\/strong><\/span>
\nClandestine War Engaged<\/strong><\/span>
\nCeau\u015fescu has gone too far. He leads the fight against us [and] he is the fundamental<\/span>
\n obstruction to our line. …We have had patience regarding Romanian behavior. We must<\/span>
\n try to exert influence on developments inside the country.1<\/span>
\n– Leonid Brezhnev, August 1971
\nCeau\u015fescu has always forsaken us at critical moments. He rebelled against our coordinated<\/span>
\n policy towards West Germany… He abandoned us in the fight against counter-revolution<\/span>
\n in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Now he has betrayed us by his visit to China. … It<\/span>
\n is all directed against the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and against CMEA.2<\/span>
\n\u2013 J\u00e1nos K\u00e1d\u00e1r, August 1971
\nI cannot believe that we can exercise no influence over the Aktiv of the Romanian Party.<\/span>
\n …We mus<\/span>t even now identify those people in Romania on whom we can rely in the
\nfuture.3
\n– Edward Gierek, August 1971
\nCeau\u015fescu departs completely from our agreed line. He denies the escalation of the<\/span>
\n ideological struggle. He says the imperialists are not waging a campaign of ideological<\/span>
\n subversion. …In my view one has to orient oneself to people who in the future will support<\/span>
\n us.4<\/span>
\n– Gust\u00e1v Hus\u00e1k, August 1971
\nCeau\u015fescu is a traitor [who doesn\u2019t] give a damn…about socialism or about friendship<\/span>
\n with the Soviet Union. We in the security organs are beginning to realize that he will have<\/span>
\n to be deposed.5<\/span>
\n– DSS double agent to KGB officer, spring 1972
\nRomania sees in China\u2019s UN presence a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the United<\/span>
\n Nations and the possibility for its own nationalistic interpretations and activities, which<\/span>
\n deviate from those of the other socialist states. …The Romanian-China relationship harms<\/span>
\n the agreed approach of the socialist countries on the main international issues and harms<\/span>
\n the development of unity and cohesion of the socialist world system.6<\/span>
\n– East German Intelligence, December 1972
\n[It] is clearly impossible for things to go on with Romania any longer. Thus, some<\/span>
\n measure must be undertaken to eliminate this situation…the Soviet Army is prepared<\/span>
\n and the operation could be realized much sooner than in the case of the Czechoslovak<\/span>
\n Socialist Republic.7<\/span>
\n– Marshal A. Grechko, November 1973<\/p>\n

IX<\/strong><\/span>
\nEnemy Within The Gates<\/strong><\/span>
\n[Romania is] betraying Warsaw Pact secrets to China.1<\/span>
\n– Oleg Rakhmanin, CPSU Liaison Department, March 1974
\n[Romania should] desist from steps in the future that are not in line with our common<\/span>
\n positions regarding important questions. It is no secret that the proposals of the<\/span>
\n Romanian Socialist Republic…are in tune with the intentions of the NATO countries.2<\/span>
\n– M\u00e1ty\u00e1s Sz\u0171r\u00f6s, Hungarian International Department, April 1974
\n[Romania proposed] comprehensive international controls on the territories of socialist<\/span>
\n states through the establishment of stationary and mobile international control posts<\/span>
\n [with] the clear goal of limiting and placing under control the activities of [our] armed<\/span>
\n forces…in direct contradiction to the agreed policy.3<\/span>
\n– Erich Honecker, April 1974
\nRomania\u2019s deviance from common positions of the Socialist states on questions of<\/span>
\n European security and the reduction of armed forces and weapons closely approaches the<\/span>
\n efforts of China to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union.4<\/span>
\n– East German Intelligence, May 1974
\n[I\u2019m not] talking about US troop withdrawals but about real reductions which should be<\/span>
\n balanced and under adequate control. …As a matter of fact, the Chinese have done more<\/span>
\n than anyone to bring about troops reductions in Europe by obliging the Soviets to move<\/span>
\n substantial troops [44 Divisions] to the Chinese border.5<\/span>
\n– Nicolae Ceau\u015fescu to President Gerald Ford, August 1975
\nWhenever someone [in Latin America] disagrees with our China policy, the Romanians<\/span>
\n start brainwashing them trying to instigate conflicts; they take up rousing distrust toward<\/span>
\n the Soviet Union and breaking up the movement.6<\/span>
\n– Fidel Castro to Todor Zhivkov, March 1976
\nWith great passion the Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov along with the other defense<\/span>
\n ministers tried…to convince the Romanian comrades to abandon their standpoint which<\/span>
\n reflected nationalistic and acute sovereignty mentality. It was plain that the Romanians<\/span>
\n were out to undermine the decisions of the committee meeting of November 1976 on the<\/span>
\n clear instructions of their Party and State leadership.7<\/span>
\n– Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, December 1976
\nBeijing and Washington [seek] rapprochement on an anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis<\/span>
\n [and] take advantage of the nationalistic deviations of Ceau\u015fescu. It is difficult to say<\/span>
\n something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows what else he might<\/span>
\n possibly do.8<\/span>
\n– Leonid Brezhnev to Erich Honecker, July 1978
\nRomanian officials [are] leaking information to the West.9<\/span>
\n– Marshal Viktor Kulikov, October 1978<\/p>\n

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….<\/p>\n

ATEN\u0162IE DOMNILOR, C\u0102 NE VINDEM PIELEA SCUMP !!!\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

NU TO\u0162I SUNTEM URMA\u015eII \u201eROMEI\u201d !!<\/span>!\u00a0<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

NU TO\u0162I DACII AU PIERIT !!!\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Acuza\u0163ia de NA\u0162IONALISM ne-o \u00eensu\u015fim cu m\u00e2ndrie ! Cum al\u0163ii se declar\u0103 \u201econtra\u201d, \u00eei \u00eentreb\u0103m ce \u015ftiu despre citatele de mai jos \u015fi ce au f\u0103cut dac\u0103 le-au citit !? Este vorba de lucrarea d-lui Larry Watts \u201eFere\u015fte-m\u0103 Doamne de prieteni !\u201d http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.libris.ro%2Fpolitica%2Ffereste-ma-doamne-de-prieteni—larry-watts-RAO978-606-8255-95-8–c7926–p370518.html&h=IAQHPUsGFAQEzFK1i5QxoMInpEL0vwUcdUN_4II1VqutOVw S-au ocupat de scrierea acestei Istorii, c\u0103 doar e… \u201edocumentat\u0103\u201d !? Posibilit\u0103\u0163ile […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[696,904,210,151,905],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2231"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2231"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2231\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2233,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2231\/revisions\/2233"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2231"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2231"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bassdu.mine.bz\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2231"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}