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Continuitatea traco-geto-dacă în spaţiul carpato-dunăreano-pontic (5)

Maggio 27th, 2012 No Comments   Posted in Attualità

Acuzaţia de NAŢIONALISM ne-o însuşim cu mândrie !

Cum alţii se declară „contra”, îi întrebăm ce ştiu despre citatele de mai jos şi ce au făcut dacă le-au citit !? Este vorba de lucrarea d-lui Larry Watts „Fereşte-mă Doamne de prieteni !”

http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.libris.ro%2Fpolitica%2Ffereste-ma-doamne-de-prieteni—larry-watts-RAO978-606-8255-95-8–c7926–p370518.html&h=IAQHPUsGFAQEzFK1i5QxoMInpEL0vwUcdUN_4II1VqutOVw

S-au ocupat de scrierea acestei Istorii, că doar e… „documentată” !?

Posibilităţile sunt două :

1. Sunt dobitoci şi „se dau la noi” când ar avea altceva de făcut.

2.Ignoră cu bună ştiinţă şi… interes.

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În legătură cu NOUA POLITICĂ REGIONALĂ pe care „Mişcarea Dacia” o are între Obiective şi e determinată de Principii, unii ar putea să rămână un pic PERPLECŞI, de dată ce „punem pe masă aceste citate”.

Ei bine, noi vom pune bazele acestei NOI POLITICI REGIONALE, pornind de la ASUMAREA ADEVĂRULUI ISTORIC de către toţi cei vizaţi în aceste citate !!! Numai pe această bază, se poate „construi solid” !!!

Asta nu înseamnă că trebuie „să coborâm garda” !!! 

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În altă ordine de idei, cineva ar putea întreba „ce legătură au aceste citate cu CONTINUITATEA” !?

Au domnilor, deoarece sunt peste 2000 de ani că diverşi venetici caută să ne „şteargă de pe faţa Pământului”, iar citatele se referă la ultimii 100 de ani !!!  Acest „ultim curs al desfiinţării noastre ca Naţie”, porneşte în mod  principal cu această afirmaţie : 

„ Românii sunt un popor fără istorie , destinaţi să piară în furtuna revoluţiei mondiale . Ei sunt suporteri fanatici ai contrarevoluţiei şi vor rămâne astfel până la extirparea sau pierderea caracterului lor naţional , la fel cum propria lor existenţă , în general , reprezintă prin ea însăşi un protest contra unei măreţe revoluţii istorice . Dispariţia lor de pe faţa pământului va fi un pas înainte . ( Karl Marx şi Friedrich Engels – Opere Complete , Vol. 8 , Pag. 229 )” 

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II
Imperial Ambitions, Communist Conflicts
Surely you don’t suppose we’d fight for the Rumanians do you?1
– Allied Russian Commander, General Andrei Zaionchikovski, July 1916
Such are my feelings that if His Majesty (the Tsar) ordered me to send fifteen wounded
soldiers to Rumania, I would on no account send a sixteenth.2
– Imperial Russian Chief of Staff, General Mikhail Alexiev, December 1916
[Romania is] the Center of Counter-revolution in the South.3
– Soviet Foreign Commissariat, November 1918
[Preventing] Entente imperialism from forcing Hungary to hand over its territory, food,
industries, and prime materials to the Romanian oligarchy, is the guiding principle of the
proletarian revolution.4
– Béla Kun to Lenin, March 1919
Until the time is ripe for an attack, pacific relations should be maintained with Romania,
yet every opportunity must be used to isolate it diplomatically and an active irredentist
organization must continue to exist in Transylvania.5
– Admiral Miklós Horthy, October 1919
[I]ntensify Communist work among the Magyar population of those territories annexed
to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia [for] self-determination up to the secession
from the states which had annexed them.6
– KOMINTERN 5th World Congress, July 1924
[C]onditions do not permit the immediate realization of the liberation of Bessarabia
from under the foreign bourgeois-landowner yoke [while] the struggle of the USSR…is
transferred onto the field of diplomatic activity.7
– Bessarabian Society Congress, April 1925
The Daco-Romanians must disappear from this territory [of Transylvania].8
– Popular Budapest newspaper, April 1932

III
Stalin’s Leveraging of Transylvania
It is clear that the responsible government cannot employ all means necessary to attain
the goal for political reasons. …activity against the Romanians in northern Transylvania
can only be executed by non-official Hungarian patriots [with] the secret support of the
responsible Hungarian government… [Those engaged] in actions against the Romanians
must be entirely assured of immunity from punishment. 1
– Plan Adopted by Hungarian Government, December 1941
The solution remains separating Transylvania…either provisionally, until we reach an
accord with Hungary or Romania, or long-term, bearing in mind that this small state
will need a protector, which could only be the Soviet Union. …Romania’s dependence
on us will be even greater if Transylvania remains a self-standing state and its future
passing to Romania will depend on us 2
– Soviet “Litvinov”Commission, June 1944
That still does not mean that Transylvania is given definitively to Romania.3
– Joseph Stalin, March 1945
First of all, Hungary presented her territorial claims to Romania. We know that Romania
contributed to Hitler’s victory by fighting, whereas we contributed to it only by working.
…[T]he satisfaction of the modest and real minimal Hungarian territorial claims would
best serve the interest of Romanian democracy, too.4
– Mátyás Rákosi, August 1945
The common ideal can only be realized through a well directed propaganda… Our
trustworthy elements should infiltrate the Romanian Communist Party through any
possible path, where they should act intensively and in a disciplined manner, winning trust
in order to obtain important posts especially in the state administration. Our misguided
brothers who currently collaborate with the Romanian democratic parties should also be
convinced that through their votes to give concourse to our cause.5
– Hungarian Government Instruction, September 1946
Without Transylvania there is no Hungary, because Transylvania was always the true
Hungary.6
– Hungarian poet Ady Endre, 1954
[P]art of Transylvania must be returned to Hungary.7
– Mátyás Rákosi, September 1954

IV
Slipping Moscow’s Leash
Under Khrushchev


Give autonomy to Transylvania.1
– János Kádár, October 1956
[T]he Romanian Government does not consider the stationing of Soviet troops on its
territory to be necessary… At the same time, the Government of the Soviet Union [should
consider] the problem of recalling Soviet advisors working for various institutions of the
Romanian People’s Republic…2
– Romanian Politburo Instruction, October 1956
The appellation ‘Soviet advisors’ does not correspond to the role they play and might
inadvertently convey the mistaken idea that these advisors are meddling in Romanian
internal affairs.3
– Nikita Khrushchev, January 1957
In Romania, and even in the ranks of its Communist Party, pernicious nationalist and
anti-Soviet attitudes were developing which must be cut off the root. …The Mamalizhniki*
are not a nation, but a whore.4
– Nikita Khrushchev, September 1960
Maintaining intelligence networks in the interior of the Party, in a Socialist state, is
something you do only when you consider that you are in a position of supremacy [and]
the other a subordinate…it is not only a transgression of sovereignty, but indicative of
something more difficult to qualify, the relationship of master and slave. …We raised
the question of their not having agent networks in any Socialist country which, on top of
everything else, made Khrushchev call us “bastards.”5
– Gheorghiu Dej, August 1963
Romanian attempts to become independent from COMECON [CMEA] economically
could be tolerated, but if they are so blind as to try and leave the Warsaw Pact then our
soldiers…will have the last word …The entire situation of the Balkans would become
uncontrollable if Romania would follow Yugoslavia and Albania into the anti-Soviet
camp.6
– Nikita Khrushchev, August 1964
Transylvania has always been Hungarian…the Magyar language and Hungarian culture
predominate there.7
– Nikita Khrushchev, 1964

V
From Bucharest Spring to Prague Spring
[An] international center is no longer adequate. …No party is allowed to go over the
heads of the party leaders of one country or another, and even less to launch appeals for
the removal or change of the leadership of a party.1
– RCP ‘Declaration of Independence, April 1964
[I]f Rumania had its way it would not belong to any pact including Warsaw Pact and
would be concerned only with defense its own frontiers. …Rumania maintains its military
alliances with reluctance and their only concern is defense of their own country.2
– Romanian Army officers, November 1964
[W]ithin the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Unified Command, the armies of the
other socialist countries of Europe are subordinated [to Moscow]. We intend to do away
with this state of affairs.3
– Ceauşescu to Deng Xiaoping, July 1965
[Romania seeks] to paralyze the alliance and transform its organs into noncommittal
discussion clubs.4
– Polish Foreign Ministry, February 1966
Ceauşescu has been vigorously delivering speeches saying that Romanians, together with
all countries of the socialist camp, will fight against imperialist aggression. Of course,
that is merely a façade. Everything indicates that they intend to finally break relations
with our camp. One cannot exclude their…withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.5
– Leonid Brezhnev, July 1967
What is the line followed by the Romanian leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet!
In whose favor is such a political line? Who permits the heads of the Romanian leadership
to play with the fate of the Romanian working class, with the interests of our system, which
has been struggling for so many years? Who has permitted them that, who has given them
such right?! 6
– Todor Zhivkov, March 1968
[The Romanians] welcome the events happening in Czechoslovakia, since they suppose
that they might find allies against the Soviet Union, against CMEA, and against the
Warsaw Pact there.7
– János Kádár, June 1968

VI
1968:
‘Tourists,’ Friends & Dissappointments
[W]e are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in
Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too.1
– Todor Zhivkov, March 1968
[Romania] must toe the line or take the consequences.2
– General Wojiech Jaruzelski, August 1968
Twice in your lifetime and mine world war has come upon us, triggered by events in
Eastern Europe. …I would hope that your government would hold its hand, if it is the
case that a military movement is contemplated against Rumania or any other country in
Eastern Europe.3
– Lyndon B. Johnson to Alexei Kosygin, August 1968
[Over 100] Soviet officers dressed in civilian clothes arrived under cover as tourists
on [to take over the airport.]… Approximately ten days beforehand, Soviet officers
dressed in civilian clothing were sent into Czechoslovakia as ‘tourists’ to undertake the
reconnaissance of important military objectives. During the night of 20-21 August, they
changed their civilian clothes for military uniforms and carried out their mission.4
– Romanian Intelligence Report, September 1968
Orders were prepared last week for invasion of Romania by Soviet, Polish and Hungarian
troops on 22 November at 0400 hours…orders referred to an invasion and not to an
exercise.5
– Dutch Military Intelligence, November 1968
[W]e cannot exclude the possibility that the Russians are making preparations for very
early military action against Romania. …We think it right to ensure that the Romanians
are aware of our assessment. This should be done at the highest level possible, and in
strict confidence.6
– British Foreign Minister Stewart, November 1968
At the time they had great plans, not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against you
and Yugoslavia. If you are prepared, they will fear you. … We are helping those who
fight against invasion.7
– Mao Zedong to Nicolae Ceauşescu, June 1971

VII
Targeting Romania After the Invasion
[Moscow will use joint exercises] to attempt to achieve, as it did in Czechoslovakia, the
permanent stationing of Soviet troops and also the replacement of several high officials of
the party and state who in one way or another oppose the Soviet line. …[T]he contingency
plan of the Soviet leadership provided for instigation of diversions among population and
the establishment of pro-Soviet factions to oppose the measures taken by the Romanian
government, both domestically and in foreign policy.1
– West German Military Intelligence, January 1969
Romania refuses to participate to the common military measures of the Warsaw Pact and
requests the restructuring of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces, which would
mean in fact a disintegration of the armed forces and an objective weakening of their
firepower.2
– Stasi Report, February 1969
Of course, we are by no means trying to cause a conflict. We are trying to find some common
ground with the Soviet Union…based on a set of principles. If the Soviet Union tries to do
in Romania what it did in Czechoslovakia we will fight back. Of course, we don’t have the
pretension to crush the Soviet army, to reach Moscow and dictate peace to the Kremlin…
We cannot do this, but we will fight in Romania the same way the Vietnamese are.3
– Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Zhou Enlai, September 1969
[W]here did Chou En-lai get the idea that there was some threat to Romania, when [we]
who are Romania’s neighbors know of no such thing?…Maybe Romania does not desire
to participate in the Warsaw Pact?4
– Leonid Brezhnev, May 1970
The Romanian comrades still criticize the actions of the socialist countries [in invading
Czechoslovakia] even during other parties’ congresses, and even though so much time has
passed. Of course, this only complicates the relationship among our people.5
– Leonid Brezhnev, June 1971
[Ceauşescu’s Beijing trip] was directed against the unity and solidarity of the Warsaw
Treaty states and the cohesion of the International Communist and Workers’ Movement. …
It is not to be excluded that the Socialist Romanian Republic assumed a “mediating” role
in the relations between China and the US, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany
during this visit.6
– East German Intelligence, June 1971

VIII
Clandestine War Engaged
Ceauşescu has gone too far. He leads the fight against us [and] he is the fundamental
obstruction to our line. …We have had patience regarding Romanian behavior. We must
try to exert influence on developments inside the country.1
– Leonid Brezhnev, August 1971
Ceauşescu has always forsaken us at critical moments. He rebelled against our coordinated
policy towards West Germany… He abandoned us in the fight against counter-revolution
in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Now he has betrayed us by his visit to China. … It
is all directed against the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and against CMEA.2
– János Kádár, August 1971
I cannot believe that we can exercise no influence over the Aktiv of the Romanian Party.
…We must even now identify those people in Romania on whom we can rely in the
future.3
– Edward Gierek, August 1971
Ceauşescu departs completely from our agreed line. He denies the escalation of the
ideological struggle. He says the imperialists are not waging a campaign of ideological
subversion. …In my view one has to orient oneself to people who in the future will support
us.4
– Gustáv Husák, August 1971
Ceauşescu is a traitor [who doesn’t] give a damn…about socialism or about friendship
with the Soviet Union. We in the security organs are beginning to realize that he will have
to be deposed.5
– DSS double agent to KGB officer, spring 1972
Romania sees in China’s UN presence a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the United
Nations and the possibility for its own nationalistic interpretations and activities, which
deviate from those of the other socialist states. …The Romanian-China relationship harms
the agreed approach of the socialist countries on the main international issues and harms
the development of unity and cohesion of the socialist world system.6
– East German Intelligence, December 1972
[It] is clearly impossible for things to go on with Romania any longer. Thus, some
measure must be undertaken to eliminate this situation…the Soviet Army is prepared
and the operation could be realized much sooner than in the case of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic.7
– Marshal A. Grechko, November 1973

IX
Enemy Within The Gates
[Romania is] betraying Warsaw Pact secrets to China.1
– Oleg Rakhmanin, CPSU Liaison Department, March 1974
[Romania should] desist from steps in the future that are not in line with our common
positions regarding important questions. It is no secret that the proposals of the
Romanian Socialist Republic…are in tune with the intentions of the NATO countries.2
– Mátyás Szűrös, Hungarian International Department, April 1974
[Romania proposed] comprehensive international controls on the territories of socialist
states through the establishment of stationary and mobile international control posts
[with] the clear goal of limiting and placing under control the activities of [our] armed
forces…in direct contradiction to the agreed policy.3
– Erich Honecker, April 1974
Romania’s deviance from common positions of the Socialist states on questions of
European security and the reduction of armed forces and weapons closely approaches the
efforts of China to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union.4
– East German Intelligence, May 1974
[I’m not] talking about US troop withdrawals but about real reductions which should be
balanced and under adequate control. …As a matter of fact, the Chinese have done more
than anyone to bring about troops reductions in Europe by obliging the Soviets to move
substantial troops [44 Divisions] to the Chinese border.5
– Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Gerald Ford, August 1975
Whenever someone [in Latin America] disagrees with our China policy, the Romanians
start brainwashing them trying to instigate conflicts; they take up rousing distrust toward
the Soviet Union and breaking up the movement.6
– Fidel Castro to Todor Zhivkov, March 1976
With great passion the Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov along with the other defense
ministers tried…to convince the Romanian comrades to abandon their standpoint which
reflected nationalistic and acute sovereignty mentality. It was plain that the Romanians
were out to undermine the decisions of the committee meeting of November 1976 on the
clear instructions of their Party and State leadership.7
– Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, December 1976
Beijing and Washington [seek] rapprochement on an anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis
[and] take advantage of the nationalistic deviations of Ceauşescu. It is difficult to say
something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows what else he might
possibly do.8
– Leonid Brezhnev to Erich Honecker, July 1978
Romanian officials [are] leaking information to the West.9
– Marshal Viktor Kulikov, October 1978

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ATENŢIE DOMNILOR, CĂ NE VINDEM PIELEA SCUMP !!! 

NU TOŢI SUNTEM URMAŞII „ROMEI” !!

NU TOŢI DACII AU PIERIT !!!